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ABSTRACT 
After analyzing (1) data aggregated to the congressional district 
level, and (2) individual level data from the 1978 CPS Study, Johannes and 
McAdams conclude that congressional casework has no electoral impact. This 
commentary explains such null findings as the product of oversimplistic 
expectations and methodological weaknesses. Specifically, the Johannes and 
McAdams aggregate data analysis is misspecified on two counts. First, it 
attempts to reduce to a single regression equation a temporal sequence in 
which casework activity and electoral outcomes are mutually intertwined. 
Second, even were such a drastic reduction possible, the single equation 
employed would be poorly specified because of inattention to the 
differential productivity of cases, constituents, and representatives. The 
individual level analysis also is rife with statistical problems chief among 
which is multicollinearity aggravated by small numbers of cases. Analyses 
which do what is possible to minimize such problems reveal a statistically 
and substantively significant impact of casework on electoral outcomes. 
Further analyses which go beyond the Johannes and McAdams limitation of 
casework effects to the individual(s ) directly helped suggest that the 
electoral effects of an incumbent's reputation for service may approach the 
effects of party identification. 
SOME PROBLEMS IN STUDYING THE EFFECTS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN 
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
Morris P. Fiorina 
Until the mid-1970s the nature of congressional elections appeared 
simple and well-understood. Existing research (Stokes and Miller, 1962) 
indicated that House elections were predominantly party line affairs, 
largely because very few citizens had any additional information which could 
provide an alternative basis for voting, Even the short-term variation 
overlaid on the basic party division appeared to be party-related, 
Particular presidential candidates might stimulate a marginal amount of 
defection lower down the ticket (Miller, 1955-56) . And in midterm elections 
evaluations of the incumbent President appeared to play some part in the 
overall outcome (e.g. Kernell, 1977). Indeed, using only an estimate of the 
party division, Presidential performance ratings, and trends in real income, 
Tufte (1975 ) developed a simple model which provided a good accounting for 
the in-party's midterm losses during the 1938-1970 period, To be sure, 
researchers recognized that scandals and other peculiar local circumstances 
could overwhelm the more general forces underlying the congressional voting 
(e.g. Miller and Stokes, 1966, pp. 369-370) , but such possibilities were 
considered sufficiently random in their occurrence that they could safely be 
relegated to the error term in models of House voting , 
By the mid-1970s however, new facts became apparent. Trends toward 
nationalization of House elections ( Stokes, 1967) not only halted but 
dramatically reversed (Mann, 1978, chapter 5).  Burnham (1975 ) noted the 
increasing insulation of the congressional electoral arena, Studies of 
Presidential coattails indicated sharp declines from the New Deal era and 
even from the 1944-1964 period (e.g. Calvert and Ferejohn, 1980 ) .  And 
whether cause or consequence of all of this, the electoral showings of 
incumbent Representatives�already good�improved markedly (Erikson, 1972; 
Mayhew, 1974) . By 1978 a mainstream congressional scholar could boldly 
declare: 
The major conclusion of the study reported in this book is 
that Congressional elections are local, not national events: 
in deciding how to cast their ballots, voters are primarily 
influenced not by the President, the national parties, or 
the state of the economy, but by the local candidates. (Mann, 
1978, p. 1). 
Naturally, new facts called forth new theories. If contemporary 
House elections are greatly affected by local factors, then either previous 
research understated the awareness of the electorate, or voter awareness 
increased significantly since that research was conducted. In the absence 
of suitable time series data the question can not be answered conclusively. 
On the one hand there is circumstantial evidence consistent with the 
supposition of a better informed congressional electorate. Congressional 
campaign spending appears to have risen sharply, though pre-1970s data are 
poor. And, incumbents, at least, have increased access to staff, district 
office space, travel and communications funds, and are availing themselves 
of that access.I On the other hand, time series data on spontaneous name 
recall suggest no trends in public awareness of either incumbents or their 
challengers.2 At any rate, whether the world has changed or our earlier 
picture of it was inaccurate, the present facts seem to be that 
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candidate-specific and district-specific factors exert critical influences 
on congressional elections. 
The apparent significance of candidate-specific factors in 
combination with the burgeoning resources available to cand idates, 
especially incumbents, has naturally led a number of researchers to focus on 
the resource allocation decisions of congressional candidates. The latter 
can do little or nothing about the party division in their districts. And 
individually, they have little or no effect on whom their party chooses to 
head the ticket, or once in office how that head performs with respect to 
the national problems of the day. But all candidates have their time; why 
do they spend it as they do? The same question applies to money. 
Incumbents have staff and district offices which can be utilized to 
emphasize certain functions and activities as opposed to others. How are 
they utilized, and why? 
Those who study resource allocation in congressional elections make 
certain basic assumptions in their work. One is that resource allocation is 
purposive, not random ; candidates use what they have to enhance the 
likelihood that they will achieve their goals. And what are those goals? 
That is a second basic assumption, namely, that candidate resource 
.allocation is directed principally at the electoral arena. As support for 
these assumptions proponents of resource allocation theories cite two 
general phenomena. First, candidates themselves almost universally believe 
that their allocation decisions have electoral consequences. 3 Second there
is ample impressionistic evidence that "good," attentive, hard-working 
incumbents can "work" a marginal seat until it appears safe, for them, and 
conversely, "poor" lazy, out-of-touch incumbents can blow a "safe" seat. 
The task that proponents of resource allocation theories set for themselves 
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is to refine and document these basic propositions. Unfortunately, the task 
is not so easy as Johannes and McAdams (henceforth J & M )  suggest . 
The difficulty is best illustrated by considering some simple 
relationships between levels of various resources and/or activities and 
electoral outcomes: 
1) The more incumbents spend, the worse they do (Jacobson, 1978) .
2 )  The number of trips home is unrelated to incumbent electoral 
success (Fenno, 1978, Table 2.1 ) .  
3)  District staff expenditure is unrelated t o  electoral success 
(Fenno, 1978, Table 2.6 ) .  
4 )  The number of district offices is negatively related t o  electoral 
success (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, unpublishe'd research). 
5) Casework and pork barrel activities are unrelated to electoral 
success (J & M) . 
These "findings" appear to cumulate into a clear conclusion: the naive 
empiricist should be willing to testify before Congress that if incumbents 
spend less money, go home less often, abolish their district offices, fire 
their staffs, and cut down on constituency service activities, they will do 
as well or better electorally than they do at present . Apparently, J & M 
would willingly offer such testimony (p . 32)1 but I doubt that anyone else 
would. 
In this article I wil 1 show that the preceding "conclusion" is 
empirically incorrect as well as intuitively implausible. When complicated 
phenomena are analyzed simplistically, bizarre findings should come as no 
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surprise . The second section of this commentary argues that testing 
resource allocation theories with aggregated data poses major difficulties 
in statistical modeling .4 The third section demonstrates that untenable 
methodological decisions in the J & M individual-level analysis lead 
directly to their null findings. The facts are that the 1978 CPS data do 
reveal casework electoral effects of a magnitude consistent with the 
theoretical claims advanced in previous work. 
THE EMPIRICAL IMPLICATION(S) OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION THEORIES 
The first hypothesis suggested by resource allocation theories is 
simply that a resource efficiently allocated will produce a corresponding 
effect. Thus, in the case of congressional elections, an incumbent resource 
(R) allocated at time t is expected to produce an electoral effect (E) at 
time t + 1. Schematically, 
(1) 
Tests of this prediction, whether using simple cross-tabulations between the 
resource/activity and election results (e.g Fenno) ,  or more elaborate 
looking regression equations (e.g.  J & M )  produce the perplexing findings 
alluded to in the introduction. The reason is not hard to understand . 
As Jacobson (1978)  noted, there is also an important reverse linkage 
between expectations of the electoral outcome (E) at time 
t + 1 and the decision to allocate resources at time t. After the 1978 
election, for example, William Natcher (D., Kentucky) reported expenditures 
of $20 (to cover his filing fee and postage for mailing his report to the 
FEC). He was unopposed in the election. In contrast, Abner Mikva (D.,  
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Illinois) following a series of cliffhangers (including a defeat) and 
expecting another , spent $385, 000 and barely squeaked through. Many such 
�xamples produce the apparent negative relationship between incumbent 
spending and electoral success. It would be absurd to claim that the 
Natchers of the world do better than the Mikvas because they spend less 
money , but that is what an unthinking examination of the correlation between 
the two variables seems to suggest. If political scientists had license to 
play with the world , we could design an experiment in which Mikva would run 
two races , once in which he spent $38.50, and one in which he spent 
$385 , 000 , with his challenger spending the same in both. But lacking such a 
capability we are stuck with a simultaneous equations relationship in 
cross-sectional data , namely 
(2) 
This , of course , is what Jacobson saw, and what J & M refuse to see.5 
Estimation of model (2) is a more difficult enterprise than that of 
model (1) , and it still is too simple-minded. As noted earlier , in the 
cross-section the number of district off ices and district staff often is 
negatively related to incumbent electoral success. Yet they bear an 
extremely interesting and plausible relationship to past electoral success. 
Table 1 contains a series of regression equations relating the number of 
district staff at time t to the number of district staff at time t - 2 ,  
perturbed by the incumbent's electoral margin at t - 1 (the data are drawn 
from the Congressional Staff Directory and Congressional- Quarterly' s Guide 
to U.S. Elections), 
[Table 1 here] 
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TABLE 1 
The Determination of District Staff 
(Contested Elections Only) 
Congress District Staff Electoral Margin 
(t-2) (t-1) 
* 87 .801 - .0033 
(23.6) (l.38) 
88 • 779 - .0070 
(18 .5) (1 . 92) 
* 89 .781 .0048 
(17.8) (1.17) 
90 .756 - .0088 
(19 .9) (2.26) 
* 91 • 711 - .0083 
(20.3) (2.24) 
9 2  .699 - .0037 
(17.0) (.818) 
* 93 .811 - .0059 
(18.4) (1.18) 
94 . 756 - .0173 
(17.6) (3 . 26) 
* 95 .807 - .0121 
(20 . 7) (1. 98) 
96 .634 .0095 
(14.4) (1. 46) 
* on-year election 
(t - statistics in parentheses) 
7 
at Time t 
Constant R2 N 
.487 .62 356 
.965 .52 332 
.277 .49 338 
1 .47 .55 346 
1.43 .53 381 
1.30 .460 346 
1.43 .50 343 
2.82 .50 309 
2 .39 .57 337 
1.88 .38 354 
These equations show that in eight of the past ten Congresses , the 
narrower the margin in the previous election the greater the increase in 
staff over the previous allocation. The relationship is a bit stronger in 
the off-year elections , especially for the Congresses elected in 1966 and 
1974. Interestingly, the 96th Congress , elected in 1978 , is very much a 
deviant case when viewed against the ten Congress series. Table 1 suggests 
that model (2) be extended to 
(3) 
which , following the same logic as previously , immediately expands to 
(4) 
We would expect electoral success at one election to affect 
electoral success at the next election, since a bad showing may attract a 
strong challenger and thereby cause another bad showing , whereas a good 
showing discourages strong chal lengers and thereby contributes to another 
good showing.6 Moreover, Fenno's recent work (1978) suggests that 
congressmen may become captive to their past behavior: once constituents 
form expectations based on a particular home style , including patterns of 
resource allocation , an incumbent may run serious risks by trying to alter 
his behavior. Such considerations suggest additional links between the 
temporal pattern of electoral outcomes and the temporal allocation of 
resources , namely , 
(5) 
In principle , we should push this sequence back to the present incumbent's 
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first election , but that seems too great a demand to put on any researcher. 
At the minimum I would regard an estimation of model (5) as a reasonable way 
of investigating the effects of resource allocation at time t on the 
election outcome at time t + 1. 
As model (5) illustrates, electoral outcomes and resource allocation 
decisions are continuously intertwined across an incumbent's tenure in 
office. Even the minimal two-period version of model ( 5) is a four equation 
structural system with four endogeneous variables , and this is just 
considering one resource. In stark contrast , the J & M district level 
analysis amounts to little more than estimating marginally different 
versions of model (1). At one point (p, 14) J & M report a perfunctory 
attempt at estimating model (2) using a very noisy instrumental variable for 
casework.7 While this procedure at last yields a positive coefficient for 
casework , the estimate is predictably imprecise, For the most part, 
however , J & M rely on estimations of model (1) and dismiss out of hand the 
likelihood of any additional complications (e.g. J & M, pp. 12-13).8 Though 
it is conceivable that future research might prove their decision correct, 
there are no grounds for asserting its correctness prior to carrying out 
that research, 
The misspecification problems in J & M's aggregate analysis are not 
limited to their reduction of a simultaneous equations system to a single 
OLS regression. Even if the relationships between casework and electoral 
outcomes could be captured by a single equation , the J & M specifications 
would be open to serious questions. For example , J & M implicitly assume 
that all cases have equal impact arose all representatives , districts , and 
constituents: in their simple linear models if 100 cases produce an effect 
on the vote of b percent , then 200 cases must produce an effect of 2b 
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percent , 500 cases of Sb percent , etc. Among the questions one might ask 
are two major ones. First , do all cases have the same impact? Do 40 0 
social security and VA cases necessarily produce an electoral effect 40 
times greater than 10 cases involving local school boards , community groups , 
mayors , contractors , etc.? J & M's analysis implicitly says yes. Second , 
even given some particular type of case , is electoral productivity 
independent of constituent and/or district characteristics? J & M allow for 
only one possibility , an additive effect of education. Others are certainly 
likely, though difficult to get at empirically. In a district with a stable 
population and integrated social structure , news of a successfully resolved 
case may spread far and wide ; in an urban ghetto only the person directly 
involved may ever have knowledge of the case. We might expect the electoral 
effectiveness of a case to vary with the electoral strength of the 
incumbent, One already garnering 80 percent of the vote may have a harder 
time increasing his total than one garnering only 5 1  percent ; most people 
helped by the former already support him , and the remaining opposition 
consists of the irreconcilables in the district.9 The electoral 
effectiveness of a case may vary with the constituent helped ; perhaps 
independents are won over more easily than adherents of the opposition 
party. One could suggest many such possibilities , but these few should make 
the point. J & M have rough estimates of the simple number of cases handled 
by congressional of fices. Their aggregate analysis does not consider the 
success rates in handling these , and it makes the presumption that all that 
matters is the sheer number of cases handled, independent of numerous 
relevant characteristics of the incumbent , the constituent helped , and the 
district. Although their anaylsis looks methodologically complex and 
substantively comprehensive , it is actually oversimplistic on both counts.IO 
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In the fall of 1977 representatives of the congressional elections 
research community met at the University of Rochester under the auspices of 
the Center for Political Studies and the Board of Overseers of the National 
Election Studies. That conference debated the wisdom of devoting much of 
the 1978 survey to the subject of citizen perceptions of the activities of 
the congressional candidates (when the literature suggested that few 
citizens had any perceptions). Some researchers felt that theories of the 
incumbency advantage , for example, should be explored first using aggregate 
data , as J & M have tried to do. After considering the kinds of 
methodological problems just discussed , however, the conference decided that 
individual level data was the most appropriate for studying questions about 
the electoral effects of candidate resource allocation, 
EVIDENCE FROM THE 1978 CPS ELECTION STUDY 
On the level of the individual voter, the problems discussed in the 
preceding section are less severe. Model specification , for example , is 
fairly straightforward: one hypothesizes that voters "reached" by an 
incumbent resource will show higher levels of support for the incumbent than 
those not reached , ceteris paribus. Of course , a lot of thought should go 
into that "other things equal" clause , but the question of reciprocal 
influence between resource allocation and electoral outcomes largely 
disappears,11 The question of the differential impact of any particular 
kind of case is moot because we have direct information on the number of 
constituents who report having received help (and having heard about other's 
receiving help). In addition ,  we can control for a number of factors which 
might condition the impact of a case--the respondent's party affiliation , 
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knowledge of the challenger, policy agreement with the congressman , etc. 
What then should we make of the null results reported by J & M? Simply that 
certain features of their analysis obscure the evidence actually present in 
the data. In this section I will first discuss several problems attendant 
to the J & M individual-level analysis , then show that correction of these 
problems reveals the expected ef fects of casework on electoral support. 
These initial results are the most conservative test of casework effects 
that is statistically reasonable and substantively plausible. I will then 
show that a less narrow interpretation of the casework hypothesis produces 
results which can only be described as massive. The exact ef fects of 
casework undoubtedly lie somewhere in between these most conservative and 
most generous estimates , but they are certainly present and substantively 
important. 
The first important objection to the J & M analysis arises from 
their def inition of casework. The 1978 Study contains the following item: 
"Have you (or anyone in your family living here) ever contacted 
Representative (name of House incumbent) or anyone in his/her office?" If 
the respondent answered yes, he or she then was asked "Was it to (1) express 
an opinion , (2) seek information , (3) seek help on a problem you had?" J & 
M define their variable "case" '-as taking on a value of one only if the 
response is "seek help with a problem." In the total sample 7 percent (166 
of 2304) fall in that category , and in J & M's statistical analysis based on 
roughly one-third of the sample who vote , seventy or so people fall in that 
category. 
In reviewing an earlier version of J & M's article I questioned the 
narrow definition of casework. Why not consider information requests (most 
must concern eligibility for government programs and/or seek explanations of 
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bureaucratic decisions) as perfectly legitimate kinds of cases? In fact , 
they are probably the kind congressional offices most like--routine and easy 
to resolve. Moreover, one can easily imagine constituent A telling a CPS 
interviewer about the "problem" he or she got help with , while constituent B 
considers a similar matter no more than a request for information 
(congressional staf f ,  too, have difficulty making the distinction). The 
"seek help" and "seek information" variables seem to have similar 
relationships to other variables of interest (vote, job performance ratings , 
ect.) so I recommended that both categories should be regarded as cases. 
What I meant , of course , was to combine the "seek help" and "seek 
information" items into one casework variable. The addition of the 119 
persons in the "seek information" category yields 285 people in the whole 
sample who report casework experiences with the congressional offices , and 
120 or so voters in the J & M analysis on whom to base an estimate. 
Unfortunately J & M add the information variable separately in Table 2, then 
report that neither information requests nor· problem requests have a 
significant impact on the vote. It is not unreasonable to suggest that a 
better estimate might be obtained from a single category of 120 or so people 
than from two categories of 70 and 50, particularly in light of the next 
problem. 
The second important problem with the J & M analysis is that it is 
plagued by multicollinearity. In recent years multicollinearity has been 
overplayed in the literature, serving as a general all-purpose criticism. 
But it should not be lightly dismissed in the present instance, so let us 
consider the problem and its relevance for J & M's analysis. 
Classical regression analysis presumes that the right-hand side 
variables are linearly independent ; if they are not, multicollinearity 
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exists, In any real analysis it is not a question of existence , but one of 
degree, At low levels of intercorrelation multicollinearity typically poses 
no great problem, At higher levels the problem becomes more severe. At the 
limit--a perfect relationship between one variable and some other(s)--the 
matrix of observations on the right-hand side variables is of less than full 
rank and the statistical procedure can not be performed ,12 At anything less
than the limit the general effect of multicollinearity is to make it 
difficult to disentangle the separate effects of the right-hand side 
variables, Their standard errors are inflated�and therefore it becomes 
more difficult to show that any particular variable has a significant 
effect. Variables with truly major effects (e.g. party ID) will usually 
come through anyway , but less important variables (e ,g , economic conditions , 
casework) may not appear significant either because they do not in fact have 
an effect , .Q!. because multicollinearity renders the estimates so imprecise 
that no effect is apparent when one in fact exists , The coefficient 
estimates themselves are not biased , but they are undependable , 
Multicollinearity renders them unstable in that the addition or deletion of 
a variable correlated with those already in the analysis may produce major 
changes in the coefficients of the variables already included. Addition or 
deletion of cases may have the same effect , Thus, though not theoretically 
biased , one's coefficient estimates may actually be implausibly large or 
smal l ,  or about right--one can't say--and they will be less precise 
estimates than they would be in the absence of multicollinearity , 
Given these facts it is clear that one way to handicap a particular 
theory is to include its critical variables in a multivariate analysis 
containing lots of other variables with which they are correlated , I should 
emphasize that there is a fine line between giving certain variables the 
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chance to operate , and misspecifying an equation by leaving out variables 
which theoretically belong , But J & M have a long way to go before 
encountering the second problem , 
Consider the use of the contact variables in J & M's Table l ,  Those 
familiar with the contact variables know that there is quite a bit of common 
variance among them. Table 2 contains the bivariate gammas ,13 As seen , the 
contact variables on average 
[Table 2 here] 
show moderate to high interrelations: the average gamma is .64 . J & M 
speculate that only "news" comes out significant because it represents the 
most "objective" source of information about the candidates , Perhaps , but 
it may also be the case that other variables are important though their 
standard errors are too inflated to let us determine that, And it might 
also be the case that "news" would no longer be significant if we tried 
slightly different specifications , 
Our principal concern , of course, is not the electoral impact of the 
contact variables ; if their interrelations were limited to each other, we 
would not need to concern ourselves about them. But as I suggested in an 
earlier review of J & M's article , it would not be terribly surprising if 
casework experiences were highly related to contacts,  For example , if a 
citizen wrote to request help with a problem , on might suspect that he or 
she would have a high probability of reporting a letter from the incumbent 
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TABLE 2 
Gammas r:: ::: ..., .., .., � ' QI ' <-J 
Met ---
Meeting .89 ---
Staff . 82 . 78 ---
Mail .67 . 62 . 68 ---
News . 68 . 69 • 71 . 75 
Radio . 45 . 47 . 54 . 60 
TV . 48 .52 .45 . 5 6  
Info . 66 . 67 .84 . 70 
Help . 67 .64 . 83 .56 
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or his staff (129 of 166 help seekers report receiving mail, and 101 of 119 
information seekers). J & M reply in a footnote (#12) that casework has no 
significant effect even after eliminating mail and staff contact, but this 
does not take into account the generally high level of interrelation between 
all the contact items and the casework variables (average gamma • .60 
between contacts and seek information, .55 between contacts and seek help, 
from the bottom part of Table 2) . Thus, the mutual interrelationships 
between the contact and casework variables serve to lessen the precision of 
the estimates of both. 
Another source of multicollinearity in J & M's Tables 1 and 2 stems 
from the interrelation between seniority and the casework variables. Like 
"incumbency" seniority is an easily observed condition which we can use as a 
proxy for less easily observed but theoretically important variables--power 
in the institution, salience to constituents, record of electoral strength, 
etc. But there is less reason to use seniority when we have direct measures 
of its presumed components, as we do in the 1978 Study. Inclusion of 
seniority only further compounds the problem of multicollinearity. For 
example, constituents of an incumbent elected before 1964 are three times 
more likely to report a case or hearing about a case than constituents of a 
freshman. The former are twice as likely to recall something the incumbent 
has done for the district. And they are more likely to report contacts of 
all varieties, Seniority proxies the kinds of constituency service 
activities in which we are interested; including it in the analysis may 
capture additional influences of which we have no direct measure, but it 
also further spreads the variation which might legitimately be ascribed to 
casework. 
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Finally, by adding "info" to the equation reported in J & M's Table 
2, additional interrelations with the contact variables and seniority are 
introduced, All in all, in their Tables 1 and 2 J & M have unwittingly 
engaged in multicollinearity maximizing ; their methodological decisions 
predispose them toward null results, 
The estimations reported below attempt to overcome the problems just 
discussed, First, the casework variable was broadly defined as either "seek 
help" or "seek information," Though this provides more voters (n = 120 ) who 
have a casework experience, the number dissatisfied with their treatment who 
vote and who have data on the other varibles in the analysis is still only 
14 seven. Second, I have tried to lessen the multicollinearity prob.lem in a 
number of ways, Since none of the contact variables bears a significant 
relationship to the vote when incumbent name recognition is in the equation, 
I eliminated them in favor of the latter, For the reasons previously 
mentioned I omitted seniority from the analysis . And finally, the more 
broadly defined casework variable provides a bit more latitude for the 
statistical procedure to separate the effects of the various variables. 15 
The analysis differs from the J & M analysis in several other ways. 
First, dummy variables for challenger name recognition and challenger 
contact (of any kind) were included in an attempt to capture the relative 
·attractiveness of the incumbent's opponent.16 Second, in place of the J & M 
measure of ideological discrepancy, I have used the survey item on citizen
agreement with the incumbent's voting record, While J & M probably are 
correct that their measure is more "objective" (if less interpretable),  my 
principal concern is not ideology, and if anything, inclusion of a policy 
agreement measure susceptible to rationalization should lessen the chances 
of finding casework effects. Finally, I have added to the analysis dummy 
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variables which attempt to capture the second order or "ripple" effects of 
casework.17 J & M dismiss out of hand the possibility of such effects 
(footnote 16),  but why resort to fiat when data is available? 
Table 3 contains estimates of equations incorporating the 
considerations just discussed. The results agree with the J & M 
[Table 3 here] 
results in two major respects, First, party identification appears to have 
.the single largest influence on the congressional vote, and second, the 
general policy stand of the incumbent is of considerable importance, at 
:1east among the 40 percent of the sample that has an opinion of the 
18 incumbent's voting record . As for casework, however, these results differ 
1from the J & M results . From equation 1 we see that a personally 
'satisfactory case experience has a significant positive effect on the 
probability of voting for the incumbent, and a personally unsatisfactory 
experience (very rare) has a significant negative effect, Granted, the ,10 
significance level is a bit lower than we normally stipulate, but it is 
still a far cry from suggesting the absence of a relationship, and 
considering the small number of cases underlying these estimates it is not 
bad at all, Equation 2 is the same as equation 1 except that dummy 
variables representing the case experiences of friends and relatives are 
included, As one would expect, the satisfactory and unsatisfactory 
experiences of friends and relatives also have corresponding effects on the 
citizen's probability of voting for the incumbent , Notice however, that 
inclusion of the second hand experience variables deprives the personal 
experience variables of statistical significance (without altering the 
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TABLE 3 
Probit Estimates of 1978 Vote for Incumbent in Contested Elections 
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Recognize Incumbent .84** .78** 
Recognize Challenger -.51** -.51** 
Contact with Challenger -.35"'* -.37** 
Personal Casework Very Satisfied .39t .33 Somewhat Satisfied .02 -.06 Experience Not Satisfied -.93t -. 74 
Secondhand Casework Satisfied 
.26t 
Somewhat Satisfied .37 Experience Not Satisfied -.89* 
Combined Casework Excellent Good Experience Bad 
Pork .30t .27 
Agree 1.12** 1.08** 
Opinion of Somewhat Agree .64** .65** Neutral -.20 -.19 Voting Record Disagree -.48* -.42* 
Party ID Opposite Incumbent -.78** -. 78** Same as Incumbent .74** .76** 
Constant .33 .36t 
n 747 747 
R2 .55 .57 
% Correctly Predicted 85% 85% 
** p < .01 
* p < .OS
t p < .10 
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Equation 3 
.82** 
-.50** 
-.35** 
.87t 
.24t 
-.92** 
1.06** 
.64** 
-.19 
-.42* 
-.77** 
.79** 
.34t 
752 
.57 
84% 
coefficients to any great extent), This is multicollinearity at work again: 
the gamma between satisfactory personal and secondhand case experiences is 
.75, while that between unsatisfactory personal and second hand experiences 
is .87. Equation 3 alleviates the multicollinearity problem in two ways, 
First, it omits the variable, pork, which relates to personal and second 
hand satisfactory case experiences at about the ,6 level ( gamma), 19 Second,
equation 3 combines the personal and second hand case variables into a 
simple index represented as follows: "Excellent" takes on a value of 1 if 
the respondent reports both satisfactory personal and second hand 
experiences; "Good" takes on a value of 1 if the respondent reports a 
satisfactory personal experience and either no second hand experience or a 
so-so experience, or if the respondent reports a satisfactory second hand 
experience and either no personal experience or a somewhat satisfactory one; 
"Bad" takes on a value of 1 if the respondent reports either an 
unsatisfactory personal or second hand experience ( two respondents who 
reported one satisfactory and one unsatisfactory experience were relegated 
to the reference category), As seen in the third column of the table, these 
dummy variables representing the combined effects of case experience achieve 
,a degree of statistical precision that should satisfy all but the most 
obsessive devotees of statistical significance. The important point 
- however, is not so much the precise value or significance level of any 
casework coefficient in Table 3, but rather the overall picture conveyed by 
the table, namely, that casework experiences have the theoretically (not to 
mention common-sensically) predicted effects on the electoral fortunes of 
incumbents, 
How important are those effects? In order to address that question 
we do have to consider the precise values of various coefficients, Probit 
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coefficients do not provide direct information about the magnitude of a 
variable's effect on the dependent behavior; they must be transformed into 
probabilities, and these probabilities depend on the values taken on by 
other variables in the equation, In Table 4 I have used the estimates from 
equations 1 and 3 of Table 3 to calculate probabilities of incumbent support 
under the assumptions that the citizen recognizes both the incumbent (90 
percent do) and the challenger ( less than 40 percent do), reports a contact 
by the challenger ( less than 40 percent do), has no opinion of the 
incumbent's voting record (only 40 percent do), and remembers no pork the 
incumbent has procured ( only 14 percent do), On balance these assumptions 
favor the challenger, i. e. the estimated probabilities of incumbent support 
are lower than in the overall electorate, since fewer than half the 
electorate has as much awareness of the challenger, as is assumed here, 
[Table 4 here] 
Evidently our estimates suggest a considerably larger effect than 
those of J & M, The difference between reporting no case experience and a 
personally satisfactory experience ranges from ,08 to .15 depending on party 
affiliation, Considering that about one-half the voters share the 
incumbent's affiliation, one-third report the opposite affiliation, and 
one-sixth report independence, our estimates suggest that satisfactory 
personal casework experience increases the average voter's probability 
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TABLE 4 
Estimated Probabilities of Voting for Incumbent 
as a Function of Party ID and Casework Satisfaction 
Opposite Incumbent 
Party ID 
Independent Same as Incumbent 
No Case .32 .62 .8S 
Not Satisfied .08 .27 .SS 
Somewhat Satisfied .33 .63 .86 
Very Satisfied .47 .76 .93 
Casework Bad . 08 .17 .S6 
Casework Good .S9 .71 . 90 
Casework Excellent .66 .88 .97 
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of supporting the incumbent by about ,ll, And'in the most favorable case of 
a constituent who not only has personally satisfactory experience but also 
has heard of someone else's satisfactory experience, the increment in the 
average probability of electoral resources amounts to about ,21. 
As suggested earlier, the J & M rendering of the "casework 
hypothesis" is unduly narrow, Their analysis (and the "replications" of it 
in Table 3) presumes that the effects of casework are limited to those who 
have been personally involved in a case, or perhaps know of a friend or 
relative who was personally involved, Such a formulation considers only the 
direct effects of casework. But casework, particularly the so-called high 
level variety may have important indirect effects as well, It may produce 
endorsements, campaign contributions and other forms of incumbent support 
which enable the incumbent to increase his name recognition and contacts, 
and thus gain support. In addition, a plenitude of electoral resources may 
discourage a strong challenger from making the race, thus resulting in lower 
challenger recognition and contacts, and a higher level of incumbent 
support, Work now under way shows the existence of such effects (Cain, 
Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1980). 
A second indirect effect of casework is probably even more important 
than the one just discussed, In advancing the constituency service theory 
of the increasing incumbency advantage I hypothesized that popular 
perceptions of the congressman had changed, and that such changed 
perceptions were not limited to those who had requested aid, For example, 
What if in 1958 those voters who had heard or read something about the 
incumbent had heard or read about one or more of his policy stands, 
whereas in 1970 they had heard or read about his effectiveness in 
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getting Vietnam veterans' checks in the mail? Some voters will agree 
with the policy stand, others will disagree, but everyone will applaud 
efforts in behalf of the veterans. , • , Thus, an increasing 
incumbency advantage is quite consistent with a constant informational 
advantage if information about the incumbent has grown increasingly 
noncontroversial in content and correspondingly positive in its impact, 
Furthermore, as suggested above, if popular perceptions of the 
congressman gradually change from national legislator to district 
ombudsman, even those citizens having no specific information about 
incumbent or challenger act quite sensibly in going with the candidate 
who has experience and seniority. (Fiorina, 1977, pp, 5 1-52) (emphasis 
added) 
And several theoretical articles written with Roger Noll (1978a, b; 1979) 
contain clear statements of the hypothesis that the casework effect occurs 
through future expectations as well as through past experiences, For 
example, 
As the public bureaucracy grows larger, the importance of the 
performance of facilitation will grow, and a legislator who is a good 
facilitator will be increasingly likely to be reelected, A challenger 
who is unproven as a facilitator is a riskier choice than an effective 
incumbent, and consequently provides a lower expected payoff in this 
role, This tendency will be accentuated if a legislator is expected to 
become a more effective facilitator over time, (1978a, p. 257) 
(emphasis added) 
Furthermore, the work of other scholars clearly suggests a broad 
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interpretation of the "casework hypothesis". Most prominently, Fenno 
discusses at length the desire of a congressman to present a favorable image 
to constituents, to convince constituents that as a general matter he is 
accessible to constituents, and can be trusted by constituents: 
Above all, perhaps, they stress their accessibility. Access to some 
carries the· assurance· of· access to morei and the assurance of access 
carries with it the assurance of two-way communication. The more 
acessible they are, House members believe, the more will their 
constituents be encouraged to feel that they can communicate with the 
congressman when and if.they.wish� As we have said frequently, 
however, this kind of assurance is not obtained by one-shot offers. __ll. 
is created over a long time and underwritten by trust. (1978, p. 240) 
(emphasis added) 
To be sure, Fenno is referring to more than casework here, but his 
observations surely apply to that special case. In designing the 1978 CPS 
Survey an attempt was made to tap Fenno's concern with the intangible long­
standing relationships between congressmen and their constituents. And 
interestingly, the attempt was made in the context of casework. The Survey 
included the following item, which might be termed the "expectation of 
access" or "expectation of helpfulness" item: 
If you had (another/a) problem that (name of Representative) could do 
something about, do you think that he/she would be very helpful, 
somewhat helpful, or not very helpful to you? 
In contrast to the direct experience items three-fourths of the sample offer 
an opinion on this item, and the 537 "don't knows" also constitute a 
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meaningful response in that these are individuals whom the incumbent has 
failed to reach.20 If we substitute this measure of expected casework 
benefit for the direct experience measures used in Table 3, we get the 
statistical results shown in Table 5 (the suppressed reference category is 
"not very helpful"). These results are crystal clear: 
[Table 5 here] 
a positive expectation of the incumbent's helpfulness is the single most 
powerful variable in the equation. The effects of citizen expectations are 
graphically illustrated in Table 6, which contains estimated probabilities 
of supporting the incumbent calculated under the same assumptions as 
previously. The table shows that citizen expectations of the incumbent's 
helpfulness are fully as important as party affiliation in their vote 
decisions. 
[Table 6 here] 
Of course, in interpreting Tables 5 and 6 one should be cognizant of 
the rationalization dangers inherent in an item like "expectation of 
helpfulness." It is undoubtedly the case that some citizens respond 
positively/negatively to this item because they already like/dislike the 
incumbent on other grounds entirely. Still, Table 7 should encourage those 
who believe that survey data reflect reality as well as the inner needs and 
torments of the respondents. This table contains estimates of the impact of 
various factors on citizen expectations. As shown the single most important 
measured influence on expectations is actual casework experience, 
2i 
TABLE S 
Probit Estimation of 1978 Vote for Incumbent in Contested Elections 
(with Expectation of Casework) 
Recognize Incumbent 
Recognize Challenger 
Contact with Challenger 
If Problem Arises, 
Incumbent would be 
Pork 
Voting Record 
Party ID 
Constant 
n 
R2 
Very Helpful 
Somewhat Helpful 
Don ' t  Know Helpful 
Depends 
Approve 
Somewhat Approve 
Neutral 
Disapprove 
Opposite Incumbent 
Same as Incumbent 
% Correctly Predicted 
** p < .01 
* p < .OS 
Equation 4 
.73** 
- ,S3** 
- .35** 
l.S6**
1 .14** 
1.00** 
.39 
.22 
.87** 
,49** 
- .13 
- .32 
- .76** 
.82** 
- .6S* 
747 
.S9 
86% 
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TABLE 6 
Estimated Probabilities of Voting for Incumbent 
as a Function of Party ID and Expected Casework Satisfaction 
Casework Opposite Same as 
Expectation Incumbent Independent Incumbent 
Not very helpful .06 .21 .Sl 
Depends .12 .34 .66 
Don't Know how Helpful .32 .61 .87 
Somewhat Helpful .34 .63 .88 
Very Helpful .so .78 .94 
personal or secondhand, with the incumbent.21 Satisfactory experiences have 
highly significant (and substantively large) positive effects on 
expectations, while negative experiences have highly significant (and 
substantively large) negative effects. Recollection of something the 
incumbent has done for the district also has a highly significant effect on 
expectations, as does contact with the incumbent, whether of a personal, 
impersonal, or secondhand nature, Those who disagree with the incumbent's 
policy stands also tend to expect little in the way of help from him, and 
conversely for those who support his stands. This finding may reflect only 
a more general like or dislike of the incumbent, or then again it may be a 
reasonable extrapolation from a general context to a personal one. Finally, 
note that a principal source of rationalization in other situations�party 
identification�has a relatively small substantive impact in this one. If 
citizen responses to the expectation of helpfulness item are merely 
rationalizations which reflect a more general like/dislike of the incumbent, 
one must still explain how that rationalization arises; it does not appear 
to have deep roots in party affiliation. 
[Table 7 here] 
One final objection arises. The estimates in Table 7 might suggest 
to some that the equations in Table 3 and J & M's Tables 1 and 2 are reduced 
form equations, and that Tables 5 and 7 therefore contain no additional 
information. I offer two related points in reply. First, note the 
considerable amount of unexplained variance in Table 7; though important, 
actual casework experience, contacts, and knowledge of district service do 
not come close to exhausting the content of the expectation of helpfulness 
item, This point leads into the second, namely that such an objection 
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TABLE 7 
Expectation of Helpfulness Equation (Probit Estimates) 
Name Recognition 
Personal Contact 
Impersonal Contact 
Secondhand Contact 
Casework 
Secondhand 
Casework 
Very Satisfied 
Somewhat Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
Satisfied 
Somewhat Satisfied 
Not Satisfied 
District Service 
Party ID 
Voting 
Record 
Seniority 
Constant 
n 
** p < .01 
* p < 
Opposite Incumbent 
Same as Incumbent 
Agree 
Somewhat Agree 
Neutral 
Disagree 
.30** 
.18* 
.27** 
.20** 
.92** 
- .40* 
-1.16** 
.44** 
.51 
-1.16** 
.25** 
.01 
.22** 
.90** 
.33** 
- .35** 
- .53** 
.oo 
.07 
1438 
.39 
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ignores the conceptual distinction between actual experiences and 
expectations which stimulated the analysis in Tables 5 and 7 in the first 
place, The expectations variable reflects the incumbent's accumulated 
"stock" with his constituents, It responds to the "flow" of actual 
services, certainly, but it reflects a great deal besides, And the 
incumbent's stock may be high with constituents not ever touched directly by 
the flow of services, How incumbents accumulate their stock is what Fenno's 
� Style is all about, and I dare say that it is a question that will not 
be answered by looking at the coefficients of two or three variables in a 
statistical model, 
To sum µp, Tables 3-7 provide ample evidence that individual voters 
respond positively to the casework activities of incumbents, Because the 
analysis in Table 3 incorporates only actual casework experience, it no 
doubt understates the effects of the latter (though it still suggests 
effects considerably larger than J & M suggest). Because the analysis in 
Table 5 contains an undetermined amount of rationalization it no doubt 
overstates the casework effect, But between these conservative and generous 
analyses there is ample room for casework to exert an electoral effect 
sufficient to explain a large part of the growth in the incumbency advantage 
over the past generation, 
DISCUSSION 
J & M conclude that "voters can not be bought cheaply" with 
casework. We have just seen that voters can be bought; do they sell their 
votes too cheaply? By looking down their noses at casework, J & M echo the 
biases of scores of their predecessors who substituted constitutional 
prescription for political analysis, From the standpoint of system 
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performance the discouraging thing is that rewarding congressmen for 
casework is so rational, Unless one's congressman is Tip O'Neill, Melvin 
Price, or a couple of others, his defeat or reelection changes the 
probability of building the MX Missile by an amount arbitrarily close to 
zero. To vote for him or her on the basis of such matters is largely 
symbolic, an expression of personal opinion which carries little 
instrumental value, But to many voters the incumbent's district office 
operations and personal record of service may appear to be largely a 
reflection of his personal efforts, and therefore contingent on his 
reelection,22 If these voters opt for the material and instrumental over 
the symbolic, does this make them irrational? If so, classical political 
machines are based on irrationality. It is precisely because voters are not 
fools that the constituency service strategy works, Even if the ultimate 
consequences of such behavior are negative from the standpoint of the larger 
system, the individual voter has little personal incentive to vote as the 
good government groups ask (just as none of us individually has the material 
incentive to equip our cars with the latest anti-pollution technology 
despite the fact that we all pollute), I, too, wish that congressional 
voters ignored casework, projects and the fluff in incumbent communications 
and voted entirely on the basis of congressional success in dealing with 
national problems such as inflation and energy. Unfortunately, wishing does 
not make it so, 
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5. In their footnote 10 J & M dismiss the possibility of a simultaneous 
FOOTNOTES relationship on the grounds that an event in the future logically 
*The research reported in this paper is part of a larger project 
undertaken in collaboration with Bruce Cain and John Ferejohn and 
supported by the National Science Foundation (Soc 78-15413), The paper
relies heavily on data from the 1978 CPS/NES National Election Study,
Neither the National Science Foundation nor CPS/NES is responsible for
the interpretations offered herein.
1. On congressional use of the frank see Mayhew (1974), on travel see
Parker (1980), on district offices and staff see Fiorina (1977), 
2. This important point was first made by Ferejohn (1977). The updated
name recall series shows that not until 1978 (�the major changes
in House elections had occurred) do we see any decline in challenger
salience relative to the incumbent,
3. For example, in our 1978 survey of congressional AAs 88 percent 
expressed confidence that the casework activities of their offices had
electoral benefits, Johannes and McAdams report a similar figure, 
4. If testing the "casework hypothesis" w,ere as straightforward as J & M 
presume, it would have been done long ago, Rough surrogates for 
casework effort (number of district offices and staff) are readily
available and were included in my 1977 discussion (Chapter 7, Table 5),
cannot affect an occurrence in the present, It is standard, however, 
A 
to assume that expectations of the future are accurate (i. e. Et+l =
Et+l) which renders (2) a true· simultaneous equations formulation, 
6. Since the release of the 1978 CPS Data a number of authors have
suggested that challenger weakness rather than incumbent strength is
the key to understanding contemporary Congressional elections, Space
precludes an extended discussion here, but two points should be borne
in mind when considering such arguments, The first is that whatever
the contribution of challenger weakness to the present incumbency
advantage, there is no evidence that increasing challenger weakness has 
contributed to the increasing incumbency advantage, which of course is
the central fact underlying the literature on incumbency in 
Congressional elections (recall Ferejohn's findings referred to in
footnote 2 above), The second fact is contained in the sentence to
which this footnote pertains, As Hinckley (1980) among others, 
cautions, to posit two alternative theories--challenger weakness and
incumbent strength--is the kind of simplistic thinking which retards 
intellectual progress, Obviously the decision of a strong challenger
to make the race, and the level of commitment shown by his financial
and other backers depends on the perceived strength of the incumbent,
i.e. the likelihood of a successful challenge, A principal incumbent
strategy is to discourage strong opposition, just as a principal sign
of incumbent weakness and/or mistakes is the presence of strong 
opposition. Given these widely-accepted theoretical propositions it 
makes little sense to examine the effects of "incumbent variables" and 
"challenger variables" in order to see which is more fundamental. 
Rather, we need carefully formulated models which incorporate the 
mutually dependent strategic calculations of incumbents and 
challengers. 
7. This judgment is based on a reading of Professor Johannes' paper 
presented at the 1980 Western Political Science Association Meetings.
In that paper Johannes reports casework load equations with adjusted R2 
of less than .05.
8. J & M argue that congressmen always run "flat out" in their campaigns, 
whether they have serious competition in a particular instance or not,
If this were so, the Natchers of the world would always spend $385,000
like the Mikvas, opposed or not,
9. This point, incidentally, is not vitiated by the presence in the J & M 
statistical models of ELEC 76. Whether the congressman's previous 
margin was 5 1 : 49 or 90: 10, J & M's regression equations require that a 
given number of cases add the same amount to the congressman's next 
vote total. 
10. To forestall charges of purely negative criticism I will briefly note 
that Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn and I have been approaching an analysis 
of model (5)  for approximately two years, Like J & M we have conducted 
interviews with congressional staffers (AAs) about the constituency 
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service activities carried out by their offices (our sample consists of 
the districts inciuded in the sampling frame of the 1978 CPS Study) , 
We have also compiled a file of district offices, district staff and 
total staff, from 1 958 to the present , For more recent years this file 
also includes staff payrolls, trips home by the congressmen, campaign 
expenditures and other relevant data. This historical file has been 
merged with a file of relevant data from the SRC/CPS election studies , 
Even with this data set there is no minimizing the problems that exist , 
In addition to the specification problems discussed above, there are 
errors in variables problems, aggregation problems, and of course, 
identification problems ; the project is an econometrician's playground. 
1 1 .  Not completely however--some causal ambiguity still accompanies the use 
of particular items, For example, do those who report a personal 
meeting with the incumbent support him as a result of the meeting or do 
they make a point of meeting him because they support him? 
12. Incidentally, the extent of multicollinearity is not evident just from 
examination of the bivariate relationships between the right-hand side
variables. Consider for example nine observation on three variables X ,
Y ,  Z as follows : X = (O,O, O, O,O, O,l,l,l) Y = (0,0,0, 1 , 1,l,O, O, O) 
Z = ( l,l,l,O ,O, O,O ,O,O). The correlation (Pearson) between any two of 
the preceding variables is -.5, which though relatively high still
reflects a degree of independent variation between any two of them. 
Note, however, that the correlation between X and the simple linear
combination (Y + Z )  is -1.0, indicating that perfect multicollinearity 
in fact is present. For an older but accessible and illuminating
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accessible and illuminating d iscussion of multicollinearity in social 
science research, see Robert Gordon, "Issues in Multiple Regression," 
American Journal of Sociology 73 ( 1968) , 592-616, 
13 . Note the use of gammas, Most regression programs will calculate the 
correlation matrix (Pearson r) of all variables included in the 
analysis, Unfortunately, standard correlation coeff icients understate 
the degree of relationship between dichotomous variables, and thus may 
not reveal the presence of serious multicollinearity . 
14, Those who have - worked with the 1978 CPS data are well aware that 
casework experiences tend to be quite satisfactory ones, The combined 
(help and info) casework variable has 84 of 120 respondents as "very 
satisfied" and only 7 as "not satisf ied ." 
15 , For any given level of relationship the more observations one has, the 
less serious the multicollinearity problem (except in the case of a 
perfect relationship where nothing helps), 
16, J & M include challenger spending in their equations, Presumably 
spending is a factor in achieving contact and recognition, but as long 
as we have direct measures of the latter we may as well use them, 
17. The item reads ''Do you know anyone else who has contacted 
Representative (name of House incumbent) or anyone in (his/her)
office?" If yes, ''Did this (person/group) get a response?" If yes,
"Was this (person/group) satisf ied with the response?" As in the
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personal experience item, the "somewhat dissatisf ied" were combind with 
the "not at all satisf ied 11 because of the small numbers in these 
categories (n ; 13 in Table 3), 
18, I have no quarrel with J & M on these f indings, Though it is sometimes 
thought otherwise proponents of resource allocation theories do not 
argue that campa ign spending, casework, incumbent perks, and so forth 
are the principal explanations for the outcomes of House elections, 
Rather, the argument is that such resources and activities matter at 
the margins, and that the margins- have gotten- relatively more important 
over- time, For example, 
• in order to account for the decline of the marginals we do 
not need to claim that all congressmen have opted exclusively for 
an ombudsman role and that all constituents now think of their 
Congressman in nonprogrammatic terms . , , • To explain the 
vanishing marginals we need only argue that over the past quarter 
of a century expanded constituency service and pork-barrel 
opportunities have given the marginal Congressman the opportunity 
to switch 3-5 percent of those who would otherwise oppose him on 
policy grounds to his supporting coalition, (Fiorina, 1977, pp . 
52-53) (emphasis in original) 
Whether the relative importance of programmatic/nonprogrammatic 
influences on House voting has shifted from 90 : 10 to 80:20, or from 
60: 40 to 50: 50 is not critical to resource allocation theories of 
changes in House voting, 
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19. This variable is constructed from V238 ("Can you remember anything 
special your U. S. Representative has done for the district?" ) ,  codes 
40-49. 
20 , In the total sample 616 respondents answer "very helpful , "  790 
"somewhat helpful," 219 "not very helpful," and 537 "don' t know," An 
additional 90 respondents are coded "depends", 
21. On pp. 3-32 J & M write 
It should be noted that a rational voter , whether or not 
grateful for casework actually rendered , might vote for 
an incumbent (especially a senior one) because he or she 
believed that increasing seniority correlates with power 
and that power would bring about successful intervention 
with the bureaucracy if the constituent should ever 
need help (Fiorina , 1 977 , p. 5 1 ) ,  But in such a case it 
is not the actual doing of casework , or even successful 
or satisfactory casework , that directly triggers the vote. 
Though the latter assertion is literally true , it ignores the clear 
indirect "trigger" evident in Table 7. Mann and Wolfinger (1980 , pp. 
628-629) also overlook this linkage in their preliminary analysis of 
the 1978 CPS data. 
22. Several colleagues have suggested informally that this "appearance of 
contingency" argument may not be as valid today as in the 1960s when
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extensive constituency service operations were the exception rather 
than the norm. In the contemporary Congress "everyone does it , "  so in 
reality there is less reason for a citizen to regard efficient service 
provision as dependent upon the reelection of a particular incumbent, 
Thus , the electoral effects of casework might not be constant across 
time but rather may decline in proportion to the degree that casework 
becomes a standard element of the congressional job description , While 
this hypothesis is plausible, the only data of relevance are aggregate 
historical data with all the attendant problems discussed in the first 
section of this paper. 
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